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EVIDENCE AND ETHICS--LETTING THE CLIENT REST IN PEACE:
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE SURVIVES THE DEATH OF THE CLIENT.
Swidler& Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998).
I. INTRODUCTION
The reputation you develop for intellectual and ethical integrity will
be your greatest asset or your worst enemy .... There is no victory,
no advantage, no fee, no favor which is worth even a blemish on
your reputation for intellect and integrity . . . . Dents to the
reputation in the legal profession are irreparable.'
When Vince Foster spoke the above words during his commencement
address at the University of Arkansas Law School some five years ago, it is
unlikely he had on his mind the intent to bring the attorney-client relationship
under scrutiny before the United States Supreme Court. Yet it was his concern
for his own reputation that, with a few twists and turns, ultimately provided
him a significant legal legacy that will forever affect attorney-client relation-
ships. In Swidler & Berlin v. United States,2 the United States Supreme Court
held that the attomey-client privilege survives the death of the client . Though
this had been widely recognized as the prevailing common law interpretation,
the Court set to rest fears of a fading privilege or the need for a confidentiality
disclaimer at the outset of the attorney-client relationship.4
This note examines the unusual and unexpected facts under which Swidler
arose. With the post-mortem privilege in mind, the note then discusses the
historical development of the attorney-client confidential communications
privilege, including the philosophical rationale for such a privilege as well as
its real-world practical effect. The past erosion of the attorney-client privilege
and the attempt to create a post-mortem exception to the privilege are also
1. Vincent W. Foster, Jr., Roads We Should Travel, Commencement Address at the Law
School, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, Arkansas (May 8, 1993), reprinted by The
Arkansas Bar Association.
2. 118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998).
3. See id.
4. See generally In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Tatel, J.,
dissenting). In his dissent, Judge Tatel compared an attorney's explanation to a client where
post-mortem privilege is. protected ("I cannot represent you effectively unless I know
everything. I will hold all our conversations in the strictest of confidence. Now, please tell me
the whole story.") with a hypothetical disclaimer where the post-mortem privilege is not
protected:
I cannot represent you effectively unless I know everything. I will hold all our
conversations in the strictest of confidence. But when you die, I could be forced to
testify--against your interests--in a criminal investigation or trial, even of your
friends or family, if the court decides that what you tell me is important to the
prosecution. Now, please tell me the whole story.
Id. at 238-39 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
277
UALR LAW REVIEW
examined. The note next turns to an analysis of the Court's reasoning in the
Swidler opinion. In closing, this note evaluates the significance of the holding,
suggesting that while any erosion to the confidential communications privilege
has been temporarily halted, the lack of conclusive data on the effects of
confidentiality suggests it has been halted by default only. Also considered in
the significance is the Court's implicit mandate to the legal profession to
uphold the privilege in an honorable fashion.
II. FACTS
On July 20, 1993, Vince W. Foster, Jr., age 48, took his own life.' A
respected attorney, he had spent the year prior to his death as President
Clinton's deputy White House counsel.' In the months following his suicide,
a complicated portrait of Foster emerged as a depressed and stressed perfection-
ist, obsessed with the recent press assaults on his ethics. 7 As a comprehensive
picture of the work-related pressures bearing down on Foster developed, it
became clear that foremost among them was a deep concern for the potential
ramifications from his role, as well as that of others, in the White House Travel
Office firings
This deep concern led Foster to Washington, D.C. attorney James
Hamilton on a Sunday afternoon nine days before his death.9 After assuring
Foster their conversation was privileged, Hamilton listened and took notes as
Foster divulged his concerns and, apparently, some potentially critical facts.'"
5. See David Von Drehle, The Crumbling of a Pillar in Washington; Only Clinton Aide
Foster Knew What Drove Him to Fort Marcy, THE WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 1993, at A 1.
6. See id.
7. See Jason DeParle, A Life Undone-A Special Report; Portrait of a White House Aide
Ensnared by His Perfectionism, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1993, at 1; Von Drehle, supra note 5, at
Al.
8. See Stephen Labaton, Supreme Court Hears Case on Ex-White House Counsel's
Notes, N.Y. TIMEs, June 9, 1998, at A19. On May 19, 1993, among allegations of financial
mismanagement, seven career employees of the White House Travel Office were fired. Initially
the FBI was brought in to investigate, and several other investigations followed--of the White
House handling (or mishandling) of the firings. See generally Brief for Respondents at 3 and
n.1, Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998) (No. 97-1192) (describing
briefly the events and controversy regarding the White House Travel Office firings).
9. See Brief for Petitioners at 2, Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081
(1998) (No. 97-1192). Hamilton's law firm, Swidler & Berlin, is the named petitioner in the
case. Hamilton, the author of a book on representing clients before congressional hearings, has
represented several public figures facing ethics investigations. See Roger Parloff, Can We
Talk?, AM. LAW., June 1998, at 5, 7.
10. See Brief for Petitioners at 2. See also All Things Considered (National Public Radio
broadcast, June 8, 1998), available in 1998 WL 3645234. Hamilton explained:
We talked for two hours in my living room. I took three pages of notes. Before the
conversation started, Mr. Foster said: 'Jim, is this a privileged conversation?' And
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Two years later, while investigating the White House travel office firings, a
federal grand jury under the direction of Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr
subpoenaed those same notes." Hamilton and his law firm moved to quash or
modify the subpoena, and after inspecting Hamilton's notes from his meeting
with Foster, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia agreed
that the notes were protected from disclosure by the attorney-client and work
product privileges. 2
In In re Sealed Case,3 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed and remanded, ordering the district court to apply a balancing
test to determine whether Hamilton's notes should be disclosed. 4 The court
of appeals recognized (and the parties agreed) that the notes would be subject
to privilege if Foster were alive.' 5 However, because the factual information
contained in the notes was no longer available elsewhere due to Foster's death,
the court of appeals found that a qualification of the privilege was in order.16
Such a qualification would allow the post-mortem use (in criminal
matters) of privileged information gleaned from the attorney-client relationship
upon a showing of substantial relative importance.' 7 Under the reasoning of
the court of appeals, the scope of the post-mortem attorney-client privilege
should not be absolute; rather, it should be subject to narrow exception.I"
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 9 to examine the scope
of the attorney-client privilege after the death of the client.2' In particular, the
I said: 'of course.' It is my opinion, as I've said to the court of appeals, that had I
answered that question 'no,' there would have been no conversation and no notes.
Id.
11. See id.
12. See Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2083. Presiding at the district court level was Chief Judge
John Garrett Penn. [Author's note: The Supreme Court predicated its opinion on the attorney-
client confidential communications privilege alone; therefore, this note will not discuss
Petitioners' work product claims or the work product doctrine.]
13. 124 F.3d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1997), rev'd sub nom. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118
S. Ct. 2081 (1998).
14. See id.
15. See id. at 231.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 235.
18. See id. at 234. Specifically, the court of appeals stated:
Although witness unavailability alone would not justify qualification of the
privilege, we think that unavailability through death, coupled with the non-existence
of any client concern for criminal liability after death, creates a discrete realm (use
in criminal proceedings after the death of the client) where the privilege should not
automatically apply.
Id. For further discussion of the reasoning of the court of appeals, see infra text accompanying
notes 84 to 87.
19. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1358 (1998).
20. See Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2084.
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Court agreed to consider whether the privilege should be absolute, or whether
a balancing test should apply.2 In keeping with centuries of common law
historical practice, the Court held that the notes were protected by the attorney-
client privilege.22
m. BACKGROUND
A. The Evidentiary Attorney-Client Privilege and the Ethical Duty of
Confidentiality
1. A Brief History of Confidential Communications in the Attorney-
Client Relationship
The confidential communications privilege enjoyed within the attorney-
client relationship is born of two bodies of law: evidence and ethics. 23 As the
oldest of the confidential communication privileges, the Anglo-American
evidentiary attorney-client privilege dates back over four hundred years to the
reign of Elizabeth 1.24 The early impetus for the privilege developed from the
value placed on an attorney's honor, yet by the mid-nineteenth century the
underlying focus shifted to the needs of the client-in particular, the need to
foster a sense of security for the client soliciting legal advice.25
While the American judiciary has protected attorney-client communica-
tions under the evidentiary privilege from its earliest times, the touchstone for
the current scope of the privilege is Federal Rule of Evidence 501, enacted in
1975 .26 The present version of Rule 501, which calls on the courts to review
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See Brian R. Hood, Note and Comment, The Attorney-Client Privilege and a Revised
Rule 1.6: Permitting Limited Disclosure After the Death of the Client, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS
741,745 (1994).
24. See 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (John T. McNaughton rev. 1961).
Professor Wigmore has the distinction of most famously articulating the elements of the
attorney-client privilege:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser
in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made
in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.
Id. at § 2292.
25. See id. at § 2290. An interesting function of the early focus on the individual honor
of the attorney, rather than the role of the client, was that it afforded attorneys the discretion to
waive the attorney-client privilege where honor so dictated. See id.
26. See Casey Nix, Note, In re Sealed Case: The Attorney-Client Privilege-Till Death Do
Us Part?, 43 VILL. L. REv. 285,285-86 & n.4 (1998); FED. R. EVID. 501. Rule 501 provides
in pertinent part that "the privilege of a witness, person, government, State or political
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the interplay of the existing common law with reason and experience, is
substantially broader and significantly more general than the original proposed
version.27 Proposed Supreme Court Standard 503, which Congress rejected in
favor of the generic Rule 501, would have recognized the post-mortem attorney
client privilege as surviving the death of the client.28
In contrast to the dusty origins of the evidentiary privilege, the ethical
requirement of confidentiality is a relatively recent development. In 1928, fifty
years after the birth of the American Bar Association, an attorney's ethical duty
towards confidentiality was first formally spelled out in Canon 37 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics.2 9 Canon 37, titled "Confidences of a Client,"
called on attorneys to preserve client confidences for the client's benefit.3° The
canon made no direct mention of the duty of confidentiality after the death of
a client except to indicate that the confidential nature of communications
outlasted the attorney-client relationship itself.31 While Canon 37 was viewed
as a standard to which the legal profession should aspire, its successor under
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility mandated compliance rather
than honorable aspiration.3  The Model Code also granted an indefinite
subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience." Id.
27. See FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee's note. Of the proposed thirteen Standards
(presented as rules for Congress's approval), nine specified the particulars of privileges
including the lawyer-client privilege. Congress modified these thirteen rules into the existing
general Rule 501, applicable in the federal court system. The language of Rule 501 was
modeled after Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See id.
28. See SUPREME COURT STANDARD 503 (1974), advisory committee note regarding
STANDARD 503(d)(2). The Standards, while not part of the Federal Rules of Evidence, do serve
as guidelines to the status of common law privileges in 1974. See 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN &
MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 501.10 (Joseph M. McLaughlin,
ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1997). An Advisory Committee ofjudges, attorneys, and scholars
developed the Standards over seven years and three drafts. See id. The Supreme Court voted
8 to 1 to adopt them. See id.
29. See Hood, supra note 23, at 750 & n.52.
30. See Hood, supra note 23, at 751; CANONs OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs Canon 37 (1908).
31. See CANONS OF PROFESsIONAL ETHIcs Canon 37 (stating "[i]t is the duty of a lawyer
to preserve his client's confidences. This duty outlasts the lawyer's employment .. ") Indeed,
the American Bar Association pointed out this early assertion of the continuing nature of
attorney-client confidentiality in its amicus brief. See Brief for the American Bar Association
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1, Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct.
2081 (1998) (No. 97-1192).
32. See Hood, supra note 23, at 751-52. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIB[LITY
DR 4-101 (1969), titled "Preservation of Confidences and Secrets of a Client," stated:
Confidence refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege
under applicable law, and "secret" refers to other information gained in the
professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the
disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to
the client.
Except when permitted under [this rule], a lawyer shall not knowingly:
1999]
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presumption to the continuation of the attorney-client confidential communica-
tions privilege.33
The modem day ethical standard on attorney-client confidentiality was
established in 1983 under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.34 While
continuing the principles set out in the Model Code, Model Rule 1.6 signifi-
cantly expanded the protections afforded attorney-client communication by
curtailing the circumstances under which a lawyer could reveal the intended
crime of a client.3' The Model Rules did not, however, vary the ABA's stance
that the ethical obligation to preserve client confidentiality is ongoing.36
2. Tension Between the Evidentiary and Ethical Rules Governing
Confidentiality
Ideally, there should be no conflict between the evidentiary and ethical
rules governing confidentiality. The evidentiary rule regarding confidential
communications should apply in legal proceedings, for example, where a
lawyer is asked to provide evidence or testimony regarding a client.37 The
ethical rule should apply in all other situations, governing not only the
Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client.
Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself or of
a third person, unless the client consents after full disclosure ....
Id. (emphasis added).
33. See Hood, supra note 23, at 752 & n.69; ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBIITY EC 4-6 (1969) provided: "The obligation of a lawyer to preserve the
confidences and secrets of his client continues after the termination of his employment." Id.
34. See Hood, supra note 23, at 752.
35. See Hood, supra note 23, at 751-54. Under Canon 37, an attorney could reveal "[t]he
announced intention of a client to commit a crime... [and] properly make such disclosures as
may be necessary to prevent the act or protect those against whom it is threatened." See ABA
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 37 (1908). Similarly, under Model Rule DR 4-
101(C)(3), an attorney was permitted to reveal the intent of his client "to commit a crime and
the information necessary to prevent the crime." See ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
REsPONsiBILITY DR 4-101 (1969). ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6
(1983) broadened the privilege, allowing an attorney to reveal his client's criminal intent only
where imminent death or substantial bodily harm will likely result. See id. Of interest to the
Arkansas practitioner, ARKANSAS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1996) permits
an attorney to disclose a client's intent to commit any crime; a substantially broader, but
similarly discretionary, authority. See id.
36. See Brief for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae at 1-2. "The ABA
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility takes the view that this
obligation [to keep client confidences] continues after the client's death." Id.
37. See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. 5 (1983);




confidential communications between attorney and client, but all information
concerning the representation, whether confidential or not.3"
The reality of the relationship between the privileges is less than ideal. On
the surface, it would appear that the ethical duty of confidentiality, with its
expansive reach, provides better protection to confidential attorney-client
communications.39 Yet this ethical duty of confidentiality may ultimately be
severed by a court order, which an attorney must obey.40 In comparison, the
evidentiary privilege is relatively narrow in scope, protecting a client from in-
court disclosure, but providing no restriction on an attorney's disclosure of
client confidences in extra-judicial settings.4 ' In practice, however, the
distinction is meaningless; without an assurance of a similar level of confidence
outside the courtroom the underlying purpose of the privilege would be
defeated.42 As a result, an attorney must keep all client confidences, whether
received confidentially or not, close to the vest until prompted by the court to
do otherwise.4 3 Yet an attorney can only truly guarantee his client as much
protection as is spelled out by the limited evidentiary privilege.
44
B. Justifying the Attorney-Client Privilege: The Ultimate Benefit or
Detriment?
1. The Law and Philosophy in a Vacuum
Legal scholars occasionally resort to philosophical terminology when
describing the justifications for confidentiality, contrasting deontological
38. See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. 5 (1983);
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 37, at § 171.
39. See MUELLER& KiRKPATRICK, supra note 37, at § 171.
40. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 37, at § 171; ABA MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. 19 (1983). Comment 19 states "If a lawyer is called as
a witness to give testimony concerning a client... [the lawyer must] ... invoke the privilege
when it is applicable. The lawyer must comply with the final orders of a court or other tribunal
of competent jurisdiction requiring the lawyer to give information about the client." Id.
41. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 37, at § 171; ABA MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. 5 (1983). Extra-judicial settings would incorporate
disclosure outside court proceedings.
42. See Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to
Prevent Harm, 70 IOWA L. REv. 1091, 1106 (1985).
43. See id. at 1108-09.
44. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 37, at § 171. For example, while the ethical
duty of confidentiality would prevent an attorney from disclosing critical information shared
by a client in front of a third party, the evidentiary privilege would not. See MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 37, at § 171. Cf Gary J. Holland, Confidentiality: The Evidentiary
Rule Versus the Ethical Rule, 1990 ARMY LAW. at 17 (May 1990) (discussing the inconsistency




theory with utilitarianism." In lay terminology, confidential communications
can be justified as protecting individual rights (deontological theory), including
those of the lawyer and client, or as balancing the interests of society against
those of individuals (utilitarianism).
Under a deontological, or rights-based justification, the right to privacy
is an entitlement.46 In a legal context, this entitlement is best effectuated when
confidential communications are protected. 7 In a practical sense, a client
should not be penalized by a loss of privacy in an effort to protect or preserve
other rights and interests through consultation with an attorney. With
deontological theory, individual rights are not trumped by societal interests, no
matter the potential benefit--a source of substantial criticism.49
In comparison, under utilitarian theory privacy is an interest (as opposed
to an entitlement) to be weighed against other societal interests, such as the
furtherance ofjustice. ° A utilitarian justification of confidentiality begins with
the premise that the client will not feel free to disclose critical private
information if confidentiality is not assured. 1 With truly protected communi-
cation, a greater trust will develop between attorney and client, and the client
will be more likely to rely on the attorney's advice.12 This is especially crucial
where a client reveals a future plan with illegal implications, such that the
attorney acts as society's safety net in discouraging the harmful plan.5 3 An
alternative utilitarian justification stems from the view that confidentiality
promotes judicial economy. Fully accurate information helps an attorney
decide the most prudent course of action, whether that is a settlement, plea
bargain, or a well-organized and efficient trial.5 4 These results, such as the
45. Although the most widely recognized, the deontological and utilitarian theories are not
the only proposed justifications for confidential communications. Political theories
underpinning the confidential communications privilege have been suggested as well. One
approach suggests that privilege allows society's most powerful members to perpetuate the
status quo. Another theory suggests that the confidential communications privilege improves
the public's image of the legal system, in part by suppressing post-trial revelations that could
endanger faith in the legal system. See Erick S. Ottoson, Comment, Dead Man Talking: A New
Approach to the Post-Mortem Attorney-Client Privilege, 82 MINN. L. REv. 1329, 1335 (1998).
46. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFEssIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 226 (2 ed. 1998).
47. See id.; Subin, supra note 42, at 1160-61.
48. See Lee A. Pizzimenti, The Lawyer's Duty to Warn Clients About Limits on
Confidentiality, 39 CATm. U. L. REV. 441,446 (1990).
49. See RHODE, supra note 46, at 226-27.
50. See RHODE, supra note 46, at 20-21,228-29.
51. See RHODE, supra note 46, at 228.
52. See Steven Goode, Identity, Fees, and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 59 GEO. WASH.
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protection of society from harmful plans or judicial economy, presumably
benefit the justice system more than they hinder it.
Utilitarianism can be further distilled into rule-utilitarianism and act-
utilitarianism." Rule-utilitarianism calls for a one-time balancing, resulting in
a firm rule to be applied in all like situations. 6 In applying rule-utilitarianism,
priority is given to the best balancing of interests in general. 7 Under act-
utilitarianism, each individual situation merits its own balancing test."
Therefore, act-utilitarianism is highly fact specific.
Turning to the practical application of these theories in the current case,
Foster's concern for privacy and reputation could certainly implicate deonto-
logical justifications for confidentiality.59 The Supreme Court has historically
taken a utilitarian approach to supporting a confidential communications
privilege.60  While rights-based justifications for confidentiality were not
ignored, the Court's consideration of the post-mortem attorney-client privilege
traced a rule-utilitarian framework.6' Justice O'Connor's dissent generally
followed an act-utilitarian theory, advocating an in camera balancing of
interests.62
2. The Law and Philosophy-Problems with a Modern Application
Not unlike the real-world tension between the ethical and evidentiary
privileges, the real-world treatment of justifications for confidential communi-
cations raises serious concerns. Commentators and scholars have offered
criticism that attorneys, rather than individual members of society or society
55. See RHODE, supra note 46, at 20-21.
56. See RHODE, supra note 46, at 20-21.
57. See RHODE, supra note 46, at 20-21.
58. See RHODE, supra note 46, at 20-21.
59. SeeSwidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2086. The Court spoke of the individualistic concerns for
the effects of disclosure on reputation, civil liability, and friends and family. See id.
60. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). In Upjohn, the Supreme
Court stated that the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is "to encourage full and frank
communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests
in the observance of law and administration ofjustice." Id. The historical utilitarian view of
the Court is evident in cases dating back over a hundred years. See Trammel v. United States,
445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) ("The lawyer client privilege rests on the need for the advocate and
counselor to know all that relates to the client's reasons for seeking representation if the
professional mission is to be carried out."); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464,470 (1888) ("[The
attorney-client privilege is] founded upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of
justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which
assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the
apprehension of disclosure.").
61. See Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2086-87.
62. See id. at 2089 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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itself, benefit the most from confidentiality.63 Judicial economy in discovery,
for example, may be hampered by the protection afforded confidential
communications where that confidentiality increases the costs of gathering
relevant information.' The prospect of attorney-client confidentiality
preventing the disclosure of exculpatory evidence for the benefit of the falsely
accused, or of withholding information on the location of an abducted child,
is distasteful to most members of the legal profession and to society as a
whole. 6' Further, the interests of the individual may actually suffer by
confidentiality.6 Invoking the attorney-client privilege for the sake of principle
may in fact give the suggestion that the client has something to hide.6 7
The social value of the attorney-client confidential communications
privilege is also criticized in comparison to other communications privileges
such as the therapist-patient or priest-penitent privilege.68 For example, the
social value of litigation may be meaningless, even wasteful, where clients
quarrel over fixed stakes or use litigation to suppress competition in the
marketplace. 69 Consultations with a therapist or priest, however, may promote
a more spiritually or emotionally healthful society.7"
3. Does Confidentiality Really Matter to Clients?
Beyond philosophical theories, there is surprisingly little empirical
evidence regarding the actual, real-time effect of confidentiality on client
behavior.7 The few studies that have been performed indicate that clients
frequently do not understand the privilege, but that many attorneys and clients
still feel that a general awareness of the privilege's existence encourages open
communication.72 The studies that have been performed lead to few, if any,
63. See Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. Cin. L. REv. 1, 3 (1998).
64. See id. at 7.
65. See id. at 17. Without confidentiality, however, the guilty client might not confess to
his attorney or reveal the whereabouts of the child. See id. The distaste returns, however, when
applied to situation where the client is deceased. See, e.g., Arizona v. Macumber, 544 P.2d
1084 (Ariz. 1976) (holding that a client's confession to his attorneys to two murders could not
be revealed to exonerate another man standing trial for the crimes, despite the death of the
client).
66. See Fischel, supra note 63, at 18-22.
67. See Fischel, supra note 63, at 18-22. Indeed, there is still much speculation about the
content of Hamilton's notes, or what incriminating information Foster may have provided about
Travelgate during their conversation. Yet it is entirely possible that the notes contain nothing
incriminating-at all.
68. See Fischel, supra note 63, at 32-33.
69. See Fischel, supra note 63, at 33.
70. See Fischel, supra note 63, at 33.
71. See Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2087 n.4, 2088.
72. See id. at 2087 n.4. The three studies cited by the Court include: Vincent C.
286 [Vol. 21
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firm conclusions.73 According to two studies, many attorneys and clients
believe that without the confidential communications privilege, attorney-client
communication would be hampered.74 Another study suggests that limited
exceptions to the confidential communications privilege might not curtail open
communication.75
In its opinion, the Court recognized that few court opinions have even
addressed the effect of the post-mortem attorney-client privilege.76 The Court
suggested that this lack of discussion, or lack of evidence, points to a general
presumption that the attorney-client privilege survives the death of the client.77
Prior to the Court's decision even the leading legal commentators, whether
critical of the privilege or not, operated from the presumption of survival of the
post-mortem attorney-client privilege.78
Alexander, The Corporate Attorney Client Privilege: A Study of the Participants, 63 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 191 (1989); Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 352 (1989);
Comment, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications
for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226 (1962). As the court of appeals
pointed out in its opinion, even if an attorney attempted to present the intricate details of
confidentiality and its exceptions to a client, such information might be lost "given the likely
impatience of the client with what may seem legalistic detail." See In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d
at 235.
73. See Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2087 n.4.
74. See id. (referring to Alexander, supra note 72, at 244-46, 261, and Comment, supra
note 67, at 1236).
75. See id. (referring to Zacharias, supra note 72, at 382, 386).
76. See id.
77. See id. In the words of the Court, "if attorneys were required as a matter of practice
to testify or provide notes in criminal proceedings, cases discussing that practice would surely
exist." Id. In fact, almost all cases concerning a post-mortem attorney client privilege are
testamentary cases. See Simon J. Frankel, The Attorney-Client Privilege After the Death of the
Client, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 45, 58 n.65 (1992) (stating that approximately 380 of the 400
reported cases concerning the attorney-client privilege in relation to a deceased client were will-
contest disputes).
78. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 127 cmt. c
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, Mar. 29, 1996) ("The privilege survives the death of the client.
A lawyer for a client who has died has a continuing obligation to assert the privilege.");
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 37, at § 199 ("It is generally held that the privilege is not
terminated even by the death of the client, although this view has been sharply criticized by
commentators."); I MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 94 (John William Strong ed., 4' ed. 1992)
("The accepted theory is that the protection afforded by the privilege will in general survive the
death of the client."); WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 28, at § 503.32 ("[T]he general rule (is]
that the lawyer-client privilege survives the death of the client."); WIGMORE, supra note 24, at
§ 2323 ("It has therefore never been questioned, since the domination of the modem theory, that
the privilege continues ... even after the death of the client"); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM,
MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 6.3.4 (1986) ("In general, courts hold that the death of the client does
not end the privilege."); 24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5498 (1986) (recognizing that the attorney-client privilege
survived the death of the client at common law but suggesting that the protection was in fact
very limited). For the ABA position, see supra note 36.
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C. Punching Holes: The Attempt to Add an Exception to the Attorney-
Client Privilege
Just as at common law, the Federal Rules of Evidence have left room for
exceptions to the attorney-client privilege by calling for an evaluation of
common law privilege principles in the light of reason and experience.79
Exceptions to the attorney-client privilege, however narrow, do already exist.
80
Included in those exceptions are waiver by client consent, the crime-fraud
exception, the testamentary exception, the attorney self-defense exception, and
the government entity exception." These exceptions, for the most part, are not
believed to hinder open communication between attorney and client.82
Consistent with this view, many of the few Supreme Court decisions on
attorney-client privilege prior to Swidler demonstrated a trend towards erosion
of the privilege.83
79. See FED. R. EviD. 501.
80. See Ottoson, supra note 45, at 1339.
81. See generally Ottoson, supra note 45, at 1339-44.
82. See generally Ottoson, supra note 45, at 1339-44. The waiver exception allows the
client to waive the attorney-client privilege. Since the waiver is at the will, and for the most
part, the control of the client, it does not hinder open communications. The crime-fraud
exception applies where, by an in camera review, a court determines that the confidential
communications were made in furtherance of, or in an attempt to conceal, a crime or fraud.
While the knowledge that such communications are not privileged might hinder a client's open
communication, that is an acceptable result, since legal advice should not be used for illegal
purposes. The testamentary exception, as the only exception dealing with a deceased client,
allows disclosure of information necessary to reconcile a disputed estate. Presumably the client
would want his confidential communications disclosed to further such a purpose. See Ottoson,
supra note 45, at 1339-44. But see infra text accompanying notes 133 to 134 (suggesting that
post-mortem testamentary disclosure might not further the client's intent). The attorney-self
defense exception allows an attorney to reveal confidential communications only as necessary
to put on a defense, which'should not hinder communication since such a situation is usually
the unforeseen consequence of an attorney-client relationship gone bad. As the newest
exception, the "government entity" exception is a companion to the crime-fraud exception. In
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecun, 112 F.3d 910 (8t Cir. 1997), the Eighth Circuit held
that the confidential communications privilege does not operate between a government attorney
and a White House official in a federal criminal investigation. By this decision, confidentiality
took a back seat to the government's need for criminal justice. See Ottoson, supra note 45, at
1344. Like the crime-fraud exception, the government entity exception is not concerned with
promoting confidentiality but rather with preventing misuse or abuse of the legal profession
towards unsavory purposes.
83. See generally United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989) (permitting in camera
review to determine whether privileged attorney-client communications fall within the crime-
fraud exception); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985)
(holding that the trustee of a corporation in bankruptcy has the power to waive the corporation's
attorney-client privilege with respect to pre-bankruptcy communications); Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) (compelling production of accountants' documents in possession
of taxpayers' attorneys where taxpayers were under investigation by the IRS, whether or not
Fifth Amendment might have prevented production of the documents if they were in taxpayers'
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Upon considering the Foster situation, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit decided that reason and experience could warrant
another exception to the attorney-client privilege.84 The court of appeals
acknowledged the benefits of a post-mortem privilege in maintaining a client's
privacy interests and encouraging open communication between attorney and
client.85 The court reasoned, however, that these benefits could not outweigh
the judicial need for truthful information in every case.86 Accordingly, the
court of appeals set up a balancing test in criminal cases, pitting the deceased
client's individual interest in his privacy and reputation, as well as the ever-
present concern for the attorney-client relationship on a larger societal scale,
against the need for information of substantial importance in the particular case
or context.
8 7
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
In Swidler & Berlin v. United States,8 the United States Supreme Court
held that James Hamilton's notes made during his meeting with Vince Foster
were still protected by the attorney-client privilege despite Foster's death.89 At
the outset of the opinion, the Court recognized the long-held protection
afforded confidential communications between attorney and client. 9 The
Court stated the underlying rationale for this privilege as promoting full and
frank communication between attorney and client, such that an attorney will
have access to all information necessary to provide effective legal assistance.91
The Court recognized that it is in the public interest for clients to receive such
assistance. 92 In evaluating whether curtailing the post-mortem attorney-client
privilege would hinder this purpose, the Court, as directed by the Federal Rules
possession).
84. See In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 231.
85. See id. at 233.
86. See id. at 234.
87. See id. at 234-35.
88. 118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998).
89. See id. at 2083. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the 6-3 majority opinion, in which
Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. See id. Justice O'Connor wrote
a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia and Thomas, JJ. joined. See id. at 2088 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
90. See Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2084. In support of this historic belief, the Court cited to
two cases spanning almost a century between them: Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383
(1981), and Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 (1888).
91. See Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2084. The Court stated: "The privilege is intended to
encourage 'full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby
promote broader public interests in the observance of law and the administration of justice."'




of Evidence, evaluated the common law experience of the judiciary in the light
of reason and experience.93
The Court addressed the limited, but supporting, case law for the
Independent Counsel's broad position that the post-mortem attorney-client
privilege should cease where the protected material is relevant to a criminal
proceeding. 94 The Court recognized, however, the prevailing common law
experience of the United States that the death of a client does not erode the
privilege in any way.95 Further, the Court pointed out that three state supreme
courts had expressly held that that the attorney-client privilege unequivocally
survived the death of a client.96
The Court then turned to cases that allowed an exception to a deceased
client's attorney-client privilege in the limited context of testamentary
disputes. 97 Although these cases typically recognized that the attorney-client
privilege survives the death of the client, they allowed exceptions on the basis
that the client's intent would be furthered by disclosure. 98 The Court pointed
out that it had endorsed such an approach as early as 1897 in Glover v.
Patten.99
Having established that in the prevailing case law the attorney-client
privilege is presumed to survive the death of the client, the Court then turned
93. See id. The test originates from FED. R. EVID. 501. See supra note 26. The Court also
cited to Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933), which contains a thorough discussion of
importance of the flexibility and adaptability of common law to modem experience.
94. See Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2084. See also Transcript of Oral Argument at *32, Swidler
& Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998) (No. 97-1192), available in 1998 WL
309279. Prior to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit decision, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court developed its own balancing test in the context of a civil case.
Working from the general presumption of post-mortem attorney-client privilege, the court stated
it could make an exception where compelled to do so in the interest of justice, and where the
deceased client's interest in upholding the privilege was insignificant. See Cohen v. Jenkintown
Cab Co., 357 A.2d 689, 692-93 (Penn. 1976).
95. See Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2084-85. To illustrate this point the Court cited to three
cases assuming the survival of the privilege after the client's death: Maybeny v. Indiana, 670
N.E.2d 1262 (Ind. 1996); Morris v. Cain, I So. 797 (La. 1887); New Yorkv. Modzelewski, 611
N.Y.S.2d 22 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
96. See Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2085. The three courts are the Massachusetts, South
Carolina, and Arizona Supreme Courts. See. respectively, In re John Doe Grand Jury
Investigation, 562 N.E.2d 69 (Mass. 1990); South Carolina v. Doster, 284 S.E.2d 218 (S.C.
1981); Arizona v. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084 (Ariz. 1976). New York, California, and
Oklahoma state appellate courts have also declined to allow privileged attorney-client
communications into evidence in criminal matters after a client's death. See Brief for Petitioner
at 20 n.16 (citing New York v. Modzelewski, 611 N.Y.S.2d 22 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994);
California v. Pena, 198 Cal. Rptr. 819 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Cooper v. Oklahoma, 661 P.2d 905
(Okla. Crim. App. 1983)).
97. See Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2085.
98. See id.
99. 165 U.S. 394 (1897).
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to the Independent Counsel to prove the common law tradition wrong. The
Court called upon the Independent Counsel to show that reason and experience
warranted modification of the rule; a task at which the Independent Counsel
ultimately failed.'0 '
Rejecting the Independent Counsel's analogy that the interest in settling
estates was akin to the interest in determining whether a crime had been
committed for the purposes of outweighing the interest in protecting confidenti-
ality, the Court pointed to the client's intent. °2 While a client might wish his
confidence revealed to settle his estate appropriately, the Court found nothing
to suggest that a client would routinely desire his confidential communications
disclosed to a grand jury, or that such a post-mortem evaluation of his intent
even be taken.
10 3
The Court next touched on the battle of the learned treatises: those in
support of the post-mortem attorney-client privilege, and those which recognize
such support, but criticize it." The Court passed over this criticism with little
comment, asserting instead the conventional justifications for protected
communication between attorney and client.0 5 The Court feared that the goal
of full and frank communication between client and attorney might be stifled
by a client's knowledge that his communications could be unprotected (even
if only in a criminal context) after his death.l"6 The Court expressly recognized
100. SeeSwidler, 118 S. Ct. at2085.
101. See id. at 2085-88.
102. See id. at 2086.
103. See id. Indeed, during oral argument, Associate Counsel Brett M. Kavanaugh set forth
the following proposition regarding intent: "[P]resume that a person near death would want to
fulfill what this Court has called his basic obligation as a citizen to provide information to the
grand jury[.]" Justice Souter responded: "[A] great many people who know they have that
obligation ... do not, in fact, want to fulfill it... we're being realistic." See Transcript of Oral
Argument at *29-30.
104. See Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2086. Commentators demonstrating support for the
privilege include: MCCORMICK, supra note 78, at § 94; WIGMORE, supra note 24, at § 2323;
Frankel, supra note 77, at 78-79. Commentators criticizing the privilege include:
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 127 cmts. c & d (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, Mar. 29, 1996); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 37, at § 199; WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, supra note 78, at § 5498.
105. See Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2086. Specifically, the court intoned:
Despite the scholarly criticism, we think there are weighty reasons that counsel in
favor of posthumous application. Knowing that communications will remain
confidential even after death encourages the client to communicate fully and frankly
with counsel. While the fear of disclosure, and the consequent withholding of
information from counsel, may be reduced if disclosure is limited to posthumous
disclosure in a criminal context, it seems unreasonable to assume that it vanishes
altogether. Clients may be concerned about reputation, civil liability, or possible





the potential client concerns for reputation, civil liability, or possible harm to
friends and family, opining that such concerns may result in as much
apprehension for post-mortem disclosure as for disclosure during a client's
lifetime. 107
Next, the Court turned to the Independent Counsel's proposal that
confidential communications would not be affected by a rule permitting
posthumous disclosure because the only clients who would fear such disclosure
were those who intended to perjure themselves.' 8 The Independent Counsel
posited that truthful clients, or clients asserting their Fifth Amendment
privilege, would not be discouraged from communicating with their attorneys
by a rule permitting posthumous disclosure.'°9 The Independent Counsel based
this theory on the presumption that those clientswould have revealed the
privileged information under the right circumstances (for example, a grant of
immunity) while living." ° The Court, however, swiftly rejected this correlation
between attorney-client privilege and the Fifth-Amendment protection against
self-incrimination, noting that the latter serves a more limited purpose, and
implicates far fewer circumstances, than the former."'
Demonstrating that the attorney-client relationship is much richer than just
that of attorney-criminal defendant, the Court pointed to the role of attorneys
as personal and family counselors1" According to the Court, in order for the
client to truly receive the full benefit of legal advice, a client must feel
comfortable revealing relevant private familial or financial information to an
attorney. 13 Dismissing the Independent Counsel's analogy, the Court asserted
that attorney-client communication could be obviously foreign to the Fifth
Amendment protection against self-incrimination or criminal problems, and yet








114. See id. The Court's eloquent expression of the depth of the attorney-client relationship
was as follows:
Clients consult attorneys for a wide variety of reasons, only one of which involves
possible criminal liability. Many attorneys act as counselors on personal and family
matters, where, in the course of obtaining the desired advice, confidences about
family members or financial problems must be revealed in order to assure sound
legal advice. The same is true of owners of small businesses who may regularly
consult their attorneys about a variety of problems arising in the course of business.
These confidences may not come close to any sort of admission of criminal
wrongdoing, but nonetheless be matters which the client would not wish divulged.
Id. In elaborating on the depth of the attorney-client relationship, the Court may also have been
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Further, the Court recalled its previous holdings that the loss of evidence
due to privilege was justified because without the privilege, the information
might have never been disclosed. " The Court then extended this rule to a
posthumous application, noting that this might well have been the case with
Foster. "16
The Court also noted that even if posthumous disclosure were limited to
criminal cases (as the Independent Counsel suggested), or information of
substantial import in criminal cases (as the court of appeals suggested), it
would be impossible for a client to know what part of the current information
he disclosed to his attorney might fall into those categories later. This
uncertainty, brought about by comparing the need for a particular disclosure
against the interests of society and the deceased client in protecting confidenti-
ality, was the sort of balancing test the Court had twice previously rejected.' 1'
The Court declined to add to the established exceptions to the attorney-
client privilege because of the dearth of empirical evidence on whether limiting
privilege would hamper the goal of full and frank communication." 8 The
Court opined that, while the current exceptions were harmonious with the
privilege's purpose, a posthumous exception seemed inconsistent with those
goals."9 Further, the Court decried the Independent Counsel's suggestion that
responding to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit's limited focus that
confidences are shared "in the high-adrenaline situation likely to provoke consultation with
counsel .. " See In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 233.
115. See Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2086-87. The Court cited to Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S.
1 (1996), and Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
116. See Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2086-87. Foster sought Hamilton's assurance that the
conversation would be privileged at the outset, as is reflected by the notation "Privileged" near
the beginning of Hamilton's notes. See Brief for Petitioner at 2. See also supra note 10.
Echoing Hamilton's sentiments, the Court reflected, "[I]t seems quite plausible that Foster,
perhaps already contemplating suicide, may not have sought legal advice from Hamilton if he
had not been assured the conversation was privileged." See Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2087.
117. See id. See also Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (holding that a
psychotherapist-patient privilege exists, and rejecting a Seventh Circuit balancing test that,
where justice required, would have weighed the evidentiary need for disclosure of
communications against the patient's interest in privacy); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.
383 (1981) (holding that a corporation's attorney-client privilege includes communications
between its counsel and middle/lower-level employees, and rejecting a Sixth Circuit "control
group" test, that would protect corporate attorney-client communications only where the
employee was in a position to control the corporation's action in response to legal advice).
118. See Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2087-88 n.4. (discussing studies examining the relationship
between privilege and communication). See also supra notes 72 to 75 and accompanying text.
Commenting on the limited number of studies examining the relationship, the Court stated in
its closing, "In an area where empirical information would be useful, it is scant and
inconclusive." Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2088.
119. See Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2087. The two existing exceptions mentioned by the Court
were the testamentary exception and the crime-fraud exception. See id. For a discussion of the
relationship between the underlying purposes of attorney-client privilege and the testamentary
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"one more" exception would have marginal impact, suggesting this could open
the floodgates to the erosion of privilege on grounds other than those
prescribed by law.
20
At the close of its opinion, the Court turned to the dilemma of the high
value placed on privilege as frustrating the judicial goal of truth-seeking. 2'
The Court declined to give more weight to the truth-seeking function of the
judiciary, again expressing the long held reverence for attorney-client privilege
and the historic view that it survives the death of a client. 22 In reversing the
decision of the court of appeals, the Court recognized that if presented with a
compelling reason to overturn the common law rule, Rule 501 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence provided the discretion to do so. 23  The Independent
Counsel's argument, however, was not compelling enough to warrant such a
modification. 1
24
The dissenting opinion picked up where the majority opinion left off.
125
The fundamental premise from which Justice O'Connor developed her dissent
was the inconsistency in the protections afforded by privilege and the judicial
goal of truth-seeking. 16 Justice O'Connor supported the court of appeals'
balancing test, reflecting that evidentiary privileges must be construed narrowly
and "give way" where not justified in the public interest.17 Justice O'Connor
also expressed support for examination of the privilege where its use would
frustrate justice. 2 1 While recognizing a deceased client's personal,
reputational, and economic interest in confidentiality, Justice O'Connor
stressed that were the client living, the facts he shared with his attorney would
and crime-fraud exceptions, see supra note 77.
120. See Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2087. Specifically, the Court admonished, "A 'no harm in
one more exception' rationale could contribute to the general erosion of the privilege, without
reference to common law principles or 'reason and experience."' See id.
121. See id. at 2087-88. The Independent Counsel had urged that the privilege be strictly
construed as inconsistent with truth-seeking, relying on United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683
(1974) (rejecting an absolute, unqualified executive privilege of confidentiality for presidential
communications), and Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (rejecting a newspaper
reporter's claim of privilege under the First Amendment against revealing confidential sources
involved in criminal activity). The Court rejected this argument, pointing out that Nixon and
Branzburg advocated the creation of new privileges, while the Independent Counsel urged the
Court to curtail a well-recognized existing privilege. See Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2087-88.
122. See Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2088.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justices Scalia and Thomas joined in the dissent.
See id.
126. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
127. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
128. See Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2088 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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not be privileged, and if necessary, could be disclosed under a grant of
immunity, 9
Justice O'Connor expressed concern for the scenario where an innocent
defendant might be convicted despite exculpatory information known by a
deceased client's attorney. 130 Following an act-utilitarian framework, Justice
O'Connor's dissent was fraught with reluctance to hold the right to confidential
communications universally supreme to the rights of an innocent defendant;
however, Justice O'Connor further called for a posthumous exception upon a
showing of a compelling law enforcement need for privileged information.' 3'
Rather than permitting the attorney-client privilege to serve as a complete bar
to post-mortem disclosure, thus allowing distortion of the judicial record or the
purposeful misleading of the factfinder, Justice O'Connor would advance the
application of an in camera balancing test for factual information otherwise
unattainable. '32
Justice O'Connor also pointed to a flaw in the majority opinion's
justification of the testamentary exception to the attorney-client privilege. 1
33
While the majority explained that such an exception would further the intent
of the client, Justice O'Connor suggested that this might not always be the
case. 134 Further, Justice O'Connor pointed out that the role of the attorney as
a counselor, confidant, and friend (used by the majority as a justification for
non-disclosure in criminal and civil matters) was equally true in the testamen-
tary context.1 35 Justice O'Connor also challenged the proposition that the
crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, as well as the exception
for claims regarding attorney competence and compensation, encourage full
129. See id at 2088-89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
130. See idat 2089 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). As Justice 0' Connor noted, the Petitioner
conceded that this might be just the type of situation where an exception to the post-mortem
attorney-client privilege should be made. See Transcript of Oral Argument at * 19-20. It is
perhaps relevant to note that prior to being appointed to the Supreme Court in 1981, Justice
O'Connor practiced law in Arizona (in private practice from 1957-65, and as Assistant Attorney
General from 1965-69), served as a member of the Arizona Senate (1969-1975), and served as
a county court judge (1975-1979) and on the Arizona Court of Appeals (1979-1981). See
Labaton, supra note 8, at A19. It was an Arizona Supreme Court case that in 1976 excluded
the testimony of two attorneys whose deceased client had confessed to the murders for which
the defendant was ultimately convicted. See Macumber, 544 P.2d at 1086.
131. See Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2089 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
132. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
133. See id. at 2089-90 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
134. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). To illustrate this pitfall, Justice O'Connor reiterated
the court of appeals' example that "a decedent might want to provide for an illegitimate child
but at the same time much prefer that the relationship go undisclosed." See id. at 2089 (quoting
In re Sealed Case, 125 F.3d at 234).
135. See id. at 2089-90 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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and frank communication between attorney and client. 36 Justice O'Connor
instead found that the underlying purpose of those exceptions was to protect
the adversary system itself, rather than the individual client.'37
In concluding, Justice O'Connor questioned the tacit acceptance of the
post-mortem attorney-client privilege as an established common law tradition,
focusing on the vacuum of reasoned express holdings rather than the many
holdings expressing the mere presumption of its survival.138 Relying on many
of the same authorities as the court of appeals and the Independent Counsel,
Justice O'Connor concluded by stating her dislike for the costs imposed by
silence. 39 Indeed, Justice O'Connor's strong preference is for an exception to
the post-mortem attorney-client privilege when necessary to protect the rights
of an innocent criminal defendant or a compelling law enforcement interest.140
V. SIGNIFICANCE
By preserving the post-mortem attorney-client privilege, the Supreme
Court deferred to centuries of common law historical practice. Prior to the
Court's decision in Swidler, many practicing attorneys simply assumed, if only
by an absence of consideration, that the confidential communications privilege
was eternal. For most attorneys across the nation, the rise of the Swidler case
was a disconcerting challenge to that presumption, and one that could have
completely changed the dynamics of the attorney-client relationship. 4'
With the Swidler decision, it would appear that clients can rest assured
their confidences or reputations will not be betrayed after their death. 42 Clients
are free to communicate openly and honestly about friends, family members,
and loved ones in the course of seeking legal advice. Despite a paucity of
evidence as to whether clients do indeed ponder that confidentiality before
136. See id. at 2090 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
137. See Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2090 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor's
expressed concern for the adversary system and her protectiveness of the legal profession as a
whole was also prevalent in her majority opinion regarding lawyer advertising. See Florida Bar
v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995). In Florida Bar, after conducting a two year study
on the effects of lawyer advertising on public opinion, the Florida Bar sought to prohibit
personal injury lawyers from direct-mail solicitation of accident victims for 30 days after an
accident. See id. at 626-28. Writing for a 5-4 majority, in the course of upholding the ban,
Justice O'Connor recognized the ban as a positive step in alleviating the "distress [caused by
the targeted mailings] that has caused many [Floridians] to lose respect for the legal profession."
See id. at 633.
138. See Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2090 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
139. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
140. See id (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
141. See Parloff, supra note 9, at 5-6. Parloff's article described the case as "one of
transcendent importance to lawyers throughout the country." See Parloff, supra note 9, at 5.
142. Except, of course, in the context of the already established testamentary exception.
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revealing secrets, the Supreme Court focused on an idealistic view of the legal
profession where both clients and attorneys must speak candidly in order to do
the right thing.
Whether attorneys will find renewed faith in this trust remains to be seen.
Notably absent from the Court's opinion was any explicit remonstrative, or
even encouraging, tone directing the legal profession to observe confidentiality
in an honorable fashion. It is surely unrealistic to assume that clients only
consult with attorneys to make things right, or that attorneys only take pride in
preserving confidentiality for the sake of honor alone.
43
Yet despite any lack of overt moral direction, the Supreme Court's
recognition that many clients view their attorneys not just as legal advisors but
also as confidants, friends, and counselors is a subtle reminder to the members
of the legal profession of the weight and effect of their opinions and sugges-
tions. Attorneys must now be mindful that the heavy cloak of protection
provided to the attorney-client privilege for confidential communications does
not lower expectations or standards for the legal profession as a whole.
By examining the common law in the light of reason and experience, the
Supreme Court has breathed new life into the law of confidential communica-
tions. The assault on privilege was halted, if only temporarily. In deferring to
the lack of empirical data on the effects of confidentiality on clients as a group,
the Court chose instead to err on the side of protecting the rights of the
individual client. In Swidler, the Court concluded that the time had not come
for another exception to the attorney-client privilege. This does not mean,
however, that such a time will never come. 44
Julie Peters Zamacona
143. See Fischel, supra note 63. Advancing a skeptical view, Fischel states, "If
confidentiality does not increase the probability of winning, it has no independent value." See
Fischel, supra note 63, at 18.
144. See Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2088. Indeed, the privilege may be more successfully
attacked in the future if further studies are performed and prove confidentiality has a minimal
effect on client behavior.
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